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An analysis of the propaganda of the Freedom Fighters for Israel,
one of the three movements that took up arms against the British
mandate in Palestine, provides the basis for the development of a
model of national liberation narratives. It indicates that they are best
understood as a morality play between the forces of good and evil in
which the freedom fighters will overcome seemingly insurmountable
odds and ultimately emerge victorious. This configuration is repeat-
ed in a series of nested narratives — contemporary, historical and
metahistorical, national, and universal, individual and collective —
that reinforce each other and the message they are trying to convey.
At the same time, however, these stories are in dialogue with three
rival ones — the foreign narrative of the occupying power, the dom-
inant narrative of less militant nationalists, and the prior narrative
of the religious authorities. To a large extent, these opposing tales
provide the inferential structure for the stories of the liberation
movement. In the war of words, it is not the freedom fighters but their
rivals that set the contours of the conflict.     
INTRODUCTION
A number of scholars have pointed out the shortcomings of political
causalism1 or reductionism2 in the study of national liberation movements. They
argue that concentrating on the political dimension of the struggle for independ-
ence diverts attention from the extent to which the justifications for the resort to
violence are grounded in the mainstream national discourse and the master nar-
ratives of the society in question.  The cultural specificity of each liberation
movement makes it impossible to generalize about the content of this kind of
rhetoric. However, a review of the studies that have been carried out on the Irish
Republican Army (IRA),3 the Armenian Secret Liberation Army (ASALA),4 and
the three movements that fought against the British mandate in Palestine,5 indi-




cates a striking resemblance in the form it takes. For the purposes of analysis,
these similarities are best considered under two broad headings — the construc-
tion of history and the appropriation of religion. 
Drawing attention to the profound impact that witnessing violence has on
those who decide to take up arms against the British presence in Northern
Ireland, Aretxaga argued that it has “the force of self-evidence, the power of
knowledge that cannot be contested and needs no elaboration.”6 However, as
James Scott has pointed out, experience does not exist outside the flow of dis-
course.7 Consequently, personal experiences of violence are invariably “embed-
ded in the discursive flow of collective memory that emerged as a frame of inter-
pretation.”8
The rhetoric of national liberation movements is therefore replete with ref-
erences to the past.9 The analogies invariably take the form of narratives about
oppression and victimization and, when relevant, the resistance they engendered.
Telling these stories is not designed to simply transmit knowledge about the
nation’s past. Rather, history is “condensed in key events that have become part
of the cultural consciousness of people,” and “understood in existential terms —
as a predicament that gives meaning to peoples’ lives legitimizing their politics
and charging their actions with emotional power.”10
The resort to history is meant to reactualize the past by engendering new
feats of heroism. National liberation movements hail past acts of bravery in order
to encourage similar actions in the present. Their collective memory therefore
consists of a series of projective narratives that are descriptive and prescriptive
at one and the same time.
They not only tell a story of the past but also map out future actions
that can imbue the time of individual lives with collective values . . .
dictate biographies and autobiographies to come . . . tell individuals
how they would ideally have to live and die in order to contribute
properly to their collectivity and its future.11
These projective narratives of the ideal life and death are backed up by reg-
ulative biographies12 of those who personified them. The life histories of free-
dom fighters who fell in the struggle for independence are constructed in such a
way that they can be portrayed as examples of the national ideal. Those who
resort to violence are depicted not as outcasts from society but as paradigmatic
of its deepest values. They are to be praised rather than punished for their actions.
This particular reading of history and life histories is, of course, very dif-
ferent from earlier ones, especially that of the religious authorities. Their preoc-
cupation with divine intervention is replaced by an emphasis on human action,
or what Hilda Schatzberger has aptly referred to as the motif of an active deed.13
Significantly, however, nationalist propaganda is replete with symbols made
effective by centuries of ecclesiastic rhetoric. Because of the centrality of reli-
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gion in the national consciousness, the leaders of liberation movements often
couch their criticism in sacred terms. They use the language of the faith to attack
some of its most basic tenets. 
As a result of this propensity to appropriate religious texts and rituals, tra-
ditional models are rarely discarded; rather, they are transformed and infused
with new meanings.14 Thus, the three movements that fought against the British
mandate in Palestine reinterpreted the most sacred prayers and precepts of
Judaism in their attempt to undermine the traditional understanding of them.15
Rereading the commandments and rewriting the liturgy in this way enabled them
to attack the religious worldview and benefit from its sacred aura at one and the
same time.
A similar process has occurred in the ASALA and IRA. In each of these
cases, however, the figure of the martyr was the major instrument and site of the
cultural struggle for legitimacy. Although the concepts of sacrifice and martyr-
dom are as central to the rhetoric of national liberation as they are to church ser-
mons and other forms of religious discourse, the message conveyed is exactly the
opposite. Writing about the ASALA, Kachig Tololyan drew attention to the way
in which the movement portrayed its members as “living and dying in the cen-
tral martyrological tradition of the culture, while remaining resolutely secular,
disdaining the promise and reward of any paradise.”16 Malachi O’Doherty made
a similar point with regard to the IRA, emphasizing both the similarity and the
difference between the two protagonists.
Republicanism and Catholicism are both about the reward for sacrifice.
The true Catholic and the true republican give up their ordinary lives to heroic
self-sacrifice for the attainment of a promised land. For the Catholic the promise
is of an eternity of bliss, for the republican the promised land is the republic, a
new Ireland which is imagined to be the restoration of a pure and ancient Ireland,
uncontaminated by British influence.17
This brief review of previous studies of the rhetoric of national liberation
movements seems to confirm Begona Aretxaga’s more general observation that
“it is not in conscious ideology, as customarily defined, but in a dialectics of
images and story-like creations that people delineate their world, including their
politics.”18 This is not to imply, however, that the movement’s discourse does not
have a certain internal coherence. In fact, exactly the opposite is the case. The
construction of history and appropriation of religion are part of an intricate net-
work of nested narratives19 that national liberation fighters recount and dialogic
narration20 that they engage in to justify their resort to violence. 
The article that follows provides a detailed analysis and preliminary model
of these “story-like creations.”  It is based on a case study of the Fighters for the
Freedom of Israel, one of the three movements that took up arms against the
British mandate in Palestine. Before presenting the narratives, however, it is nec-
essary to provide a short description of the ideology, actions, and propaganda
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efforts of the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel. A brief introduction of this
nature is an essential prerequisite for understanding everything that follows.21
FIGHTERS FOR THE FREEDOM OF ISRAEL
With the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 the leaders
of the Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish settlement in Palestine) faced a serious dilem-
ma. The British government, which earlier in the year had issued a White Paper
that placed rigid restrictions on Jewish immigration, land purchase, and settle-
ment, was now in the forefront of the struggle against Nazi Germany. The offi-
cial policy of the Jewish Agency as formulated by David Ben-Gurion was “to
fight Hitler as if there was no White Paper and to fight the White Paper as if there
was no war,”22 but in practice the leaders of the Yishuv only adhered to the first
part of this declaration. They supported the war effort against Germany and the
other Axis powers, and called a halt to the struggle against the mandatory author-
ities.
Within a short time, however, this conciliatory stance toward the British
led to a rift within the Irgun Tzva Leumi (National Military Organization) that
was associated with the right-wing Revisionist movement. Avraham Stern, the
party’s emissary to the Jewish community in Poland, insisted that the armed
struggle against the mandatory authorities continue unabated and he therefore
formed a rival group, the National Military Organization in the Land of Israel.
After fierce competition over conscripts and arms supplies, Stern found himself
at the head of a tiny, poorly equipped band of fighters who were determined to
form the vanguard of the struggle against the British mandate in Palestine. 
Drawing attention to the traditional British policy of divide and rule, Stern,
who by then had taken the name Yair after the leader of the Jewish revolt against
the Roman Empire in 72 AD, argued that Whitehall, and not the local Arab lead-
ers, constituted the major obstacle to the establishment of a Jewish state. There
was, he insisted, an irreconcilable conflict of interests between the British
Empire and those of the Yishuv. There was no possibility, therefore, of any form
of cooperation or even compromise between the two sides. The Yishuv had to
continue the armed struggle until the British relinquished the League of Nations
mandate and left the Promised Land to its rightful owners.
Yair and his followers not only adopted a more militant stance toward the
mandatory authorities, they also cited different reasons for taking up arms
against them. From the very beginning they insisted that the problem was not that
British rule was bad, but that it was foreign. Consequently, the fight was not
against any particular edict of mandate but its very existence. 
This stance reflected Yair’s view regarding the raison d’être of Zionism.
Referring to the “natural striving of every nation to a free homeland,” he took
exception to the rationale offered by other groups within the Zionist movement
and insisted that the aim was not to find a solution to the problem of the Jewish
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people but to the problem of its motherland. Yair and his followers were there-
fore unwilling to accept any form of partition or even to settle for the whole of
mandatory Palestine. The boundaries of the Jewish state were to be in accordance
with the divine promise to Abraham — all the way from the river of Egypt to the
great river, Euphrates. 
Setting out to achieve these ends, the National Military Organization in
Israel first carried out a number of bank robberies so that it could finance its
operations against British installations and personnel. These attacks led to con-
stant harassment by the mandatory authorities and the eventual imprisonment
and/or killing of most members of the fledgling movement. Yair and his follow-
ers were also ostracized by the Yishuv because of their insistence on continuing
the struggle against the British, and the fact that two of their operations led to the
inadvertent killing of Jews. With the murder of Yair by CID officers in February
1942, the organization ceased to function. 
Seven months later, a number of fighters escaped from the British deten-
tion camp, Mizra, and began to rebuild the movement. Renamed Lohamei Herut
Israel/Lehi (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), it was now run by a triumvirate
who followed in Yair’s footsteps with regard to both the ends of the group and
the means used to achieve them. However, they were not placed beyond the pale
in the same way; times were changing.
The receding threat and eventual demise of Nazi Germany gave the lead-
ers of the Yishuv more room for manoeuver. The growing awareness of Britain’s
responsibility for the death of thousands of Jews as a result of its restrictive
immigration policy and disillusionment with the policies of the new post-war
Labor administration prompted a revival of the armed struggle against the British
government. Lehi began to cooperate with Irgun Tzva Leumi in July 1945, and
four months later they formed the Hebrew Resistance Movement with the main-
stream Haganah. Although Lehi remained by far the smallest of the three groups,
it had a radicalizing effect on its larger and more moderate counterparts. They too
went onto the attack against the British mandate in Palestine. 
These forms of cooperation were fraught with tension and short-lived. The
more extreme cases of individual terror, such as the assassination of Lord
Moyne, the British resident minister in the Middle East, in 1944, were vehe-
mently condemned by the leaders of the Yishuv. Even in these instances, though,
the response to Lehi’s actions were by no means unequivocal. In fact, the defiant
court appearances of the two assassins and other members of the movement
engendered a certain amount of respect for their total commitment to the cause.
Sometimes together, sometimes separately, and sometimes even at logger-
heads with each other, the three movements continued the struggle until the
British government relinquished its mandate over Palestine. Two weeks after the
establishment of the state of Israel, Lehi joined the Israeli Defense Forces as a
separate unit. A small group continued to operate in Jerusalem but it was forced
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to disband after some of its members assassinated the United Nations mediator,
Count Folke Bernadotte. With that operation, Lehi exploits and the movement as
a whole came to an end.   
In order to show that their actions were rooted in “deep ideological con-
cepts and cold political logic,” Lehi’s “language of firearms” went hand-in-hand
with “a verbal attack.” The different kinds of written material and the two week-
ly clandestine radio broadcasts were conceived of as both propaganda (e.g. “an
answer to the waverers”) and auto-propaganda (e.g. “a conceptual basis for
armed actions and the instincts and feelings that precipitate them”). The cam-
paign as a whole was meant to encourage a gradual increase in commitment to
the movement’s cause. The aim was “to inculcate the idea of a war of liberation
amongst the masses by transforming their unconscious support into conscious
awareness, and turning this awareness into a commitment to action.”
With the exception of a number of pamphlets on internal matters, such as
methods for ensuring secrecy and educational curricula, Lehi publications were
not designed with a specific audience in mind. They were almost all directed at
the Yishuv in general, and even those that were earmarked for a particular sector,
such as “the rank and file” or “skeptics,” were in no way distinctive. For the pur-
poses of this study, therefore, Lehi writings can be treated as a single unit of
analysis. There is no need to differentiate between one source and another.
Fortunately, almost all the material published by the movement has been
collected into two volumes under the title Fighters for the Freedom of Israel:
Collected Works.23 They constitute the subject matter of this study. As naturally
occurring rather than provoked material,24 these writings provide a non-distort-
ed view of Lehi’s credo. Written in situ, they afford what is undoubtedly the most
authentic picture of the movement.
NARRATIVE STRUCTURE  
Richard Leeman and others have emphasized the fact that terrorist rhetoric
“constructs a bipolar world which clearly divides between good and evil.”25 In
doing so, however, they have overlooked another essential feature of this kind of
discourse. Terrorists not only relate to the nature of the conflict, they also fore-
tell its outcome. In predicting their inevitable victory26 — the victory of the
forces of light over the forces of darkness — terrorist rhetoric assumes the struc-
ture of a narrative which, as Alasdir MacIntyre defines it, is “an evaluative
framework in which good and bad character help to produce happy or unfortu-
nate outcomes.”27
The different elements of the story are, of course, intertwined. For the pur-
poses of analysis, however, they are best considered under three separate head-
ings: casting, altercasting, 28 and forecasting.29 They refer to the portrayal of the
movement, the depiction of its enemies, and the result of the conflict between
them respectively. 
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Lehi leaders often related to their resort to violence as a strategy of last
resort. They contended that since all other means had failed to achieve inde-
pendence there was no option but to conduct “a war of victims and blood.”  This
pragmatic argument, however, was invariably accompanied by a moral one. Lehi
writings were replete with justifications for both the movement’s violation of the
laws of the mandate and its failure to comply with the official policy of the
Yishuv.
According to Lehi leaders, the British laws regarding Palestine were unjust
and immoral, and therefore illegitimate. Consequently, members of the move-
ment who were brought to trial did not deny their actions or offer excuses for
committing them. Without exception, they insisted on being recognized as a bel-
ligerent party and being tried as prisoners of war, or totally rejected the right of
the British to sit in judgment.
This rejection of the British laws as ephemeral went hand-in-hand with an
appeal to “the sphere of eternal ideas such as freedom, liberty, and equality.”
Thus, Lehi members swore allegiance to “the law of the movement of Hebrew
freedom fighters and adhered to the supreme command, the command of life for
our people.”  Its authority, they argued, derived from the natural law concerning
“the right of each nation to freedom in its homeland, and to fight against the
oppressor and the exploiter.”30
Lehi propaganda portrayed both the leaders and rank-and-file members of
the movement as positive deviants31 who surpassed the conventional expecta-
tions regarding the extent to which people should devote their lives to “the life
of the nation.”  Having “left the fold in order to be stricter rather than more
lenient with themselves, they can fearlessly face the trial of the people” and await
the verdict of history with equanimity.32 Notwithstanding this claim, however,
Lehi rhetoric, in common with that of other terrorist groups, was characterized
by an ongoing tension between elitism and populism.33 Despite their belief in the
need to assume the role of the vanguard, the leaders of the movement were high-
ly sensitive to the fact that they enjoyed the backing of a very small minority of
the Yishuv. Time and again, therefore, they attributed the lack of support to peo-
ples’ “lack of courage to say openly what is hidden in their hearts” and insisted
that they gave expression to “the unconscious desire of the entire nation.”34
This positive casting of Lehi was backed up by a negative altercasting of
the movement’s opponents, and particularly of the British who were regarded as
the number one enemy. Both the movement’s written material and radio broad-
casts included a wide variety of provocation stories about the mandatory author-
ity’s involvement in incitement, robbery, and a host of other crimes.35 In partic-
ular, they recounted how the British killed women and children, unarmed per-
sons, and combatants who had already surrendered. 
But the “accusation of the accusers” was by no means limited to these and
other violent actions against the Yishuv. Lehi leaders emphasized that they were
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fighting against the very existence of a foreign ruler: “not against a bad com-
missioner but against the commission, not against the implementation of the
mandate but against the fact that it was not given to the Jewish people.”36 It was
the mere presence of the British in the Promised Land rather than the way they
behaved there that constituted the core of the problem. That is what made the
mandatory authorities an “a priori enemy” and, in turn, a justifiable target of the
Freedom Fighters of Israel.
Lehi propaganda explained why particular individuals, such as Lord
Moyne and the High Commissioner, Sir Harold MacMichael, were singled out
for assassination. However, the slide from the macro-target to micro ones was
not limited to those at the top of the power pyramid.37 Nobody could excuse him-
self on the grounds that he was obeying orders, because it is always possible to
refuse to carry them out or to return to England. Each person’s willingness to stay
and enforce British policy was therefore regarded as clear proof of his “wicked
intentions.”  All army and police personnel were either “direct or indirect mur-
derers” and, therefore, each and every one of them “deserved death.”38
Movement leaders were fearful that their followers may humanize the local
representatives of the British government. Thus, an article in the paper Hechazit
Hanoar (The Youth Front) warned them not to be distracted by any positive feel-
ings toward the potential targets of their actions.
Sometimes the victim, the target of the bullet appears, and he is flesh
and blood, like you and me. A son, a husband, a father. Is it not the
destruction of life, love and hope? . . . It is the enemy! He is guilty
of the murder of hundreds of thousands. Because of him, mothers
became bereaved of their offspring, children became orphans, and
entire families were destroyed. He is the devil at the gate of the
homeland. He is a murderer . . . Death to the enemy — freedom to
the homeland.39
Throughout the struggle against the British government and its local rep-
resentatives, Lehi propaganda drew attention to local and global developments
that were thought to have confirmed the movement’s reading of the situation and
strengthened the belief that it would, in the end, be triumphant. But these fore-
casts of ultimate victory were not based only on an analysis of unfolding events;
they also derived from an understanding of “the logic of the process.” Lehi was
fighting for the most basic right and most pressing need — national independ-
ence. The British, in contrast, were just trying “to cling on to another chunk of
land in the empire.” Fired by greed alone, they did not have the will or dedica-
tion of freedom fighters. Their attempt to hold on to the reins of power was there-
fore doomed to failure from the outset.
According to this view, the ratio of forces was deceiving. Time and again,
Lehi leaders insisted that, despite the fact that they, the few, were confronting the
many, the movement’s spiritual strength gave it “an extra weapon that cannot be
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measured in material terms.” This gave Lehi a distinct advantage over the phys-
ically superior empire. Thus, just six months after Lehi took up arms against the
British, the paper Bamahteret (In the Underground) boldly declared, “We believe
because we are right and not because we have a chance to succeed. We will suc-
ceed because we believe.”  For the members of the movement, ‘the end was clear
from the very beginning.”40
NESTED NARRATIVES: HISTORY AND METAHISTORY
Lehi, in common with other national liberation movements, portrayed the
ongoing struggle for independence as “a mirror of the past.”  The story of the
ongoing struggle with the British described in the previous section was therefore
nested in a series of historical and metahistorical narratives. They too took the
form of a morality play between the forces of good and evil in which the former
always emerges victorious. 
Lehi propaganda was replete with references to events of the past.  It com-
pared each and every protagonist to figures from bygone days. Heroes and vil-
lains alike were portrayed as being essentially similar to, or even as better or
worse, than those that preceded them. Thus, the British were likened to all the
arch-enemies of the Jewish people from Pharaoh to the tyrants of modern times.
Frequent reference was made, for instance, to the Greeks and Romans who
destroyed the First and Second Temples respectively. Significantly, however,
they were most often compared to Amalek, the apogee of evil in the Jewish tra-
dition and the only nation that the Jews were commanded to completely obliter-
ate. In this particular case, allusions were often made to the biblical text in order
to draw attention to the alleged similarities between the two enemies. The
British, like Amalek in its time, “attack the stragglers and block the road leading
to the Hebrew kingdom in Zion.”41
Lehi propaganda also included comparisons between the British mandate
and Nazi Germany. The latter was not regarded as an ahistorical phenomenon or
even as sui generis. Hitler was essentially the same as other enemies of the
Jewish people:  “the Hitlers of yesterday, the Hitlers of today, and the Hitlers of
tomorrow.” In fact, some, including the British, were considered to be even
worse than the Nazis. Not only did they fail to prevent German atrocities and
commit many of their own, they also occupied the Hebrew homeland. And that,
according to Lehi, is the most hideous crime of all, “the absolute evil that every-
thing else stems from.” 
Lehi leaders recalled the same historical events to attack their opponents
within the Yishuv. They likened them to the Hellenists at the time of the destruc-
tion of the First Temple and the Judenrat in the lands occupied by Nazi Germany.
Once again, the comparisons were often of an invidious nature. The contempo-
rary situation was thought to be even worse than it had been in the past. Thus,
Lehi recalled the presence of the “mixed multitude” who joined the slaves that
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were delivered from Egypt and bemoaned the fact that they were currently to be
found at the center rather than on the fringe of the nation. “Alas for the nation in
which the mixed multitude is at the helm.” 
The resort to Jewish history extended, of course, to Lehi itself. The writ-
ings included myriad references to those who had fought for national liberation
from biblical times until the period of the Yishuv. Lehi fighters portrayed them-
selves and were portrayed by others as the latest link in “the chain of heroes of
the Jewish people, a people that had fought for its freedom with more force, more
strength, more sacrifice and more determination than any other nation in the
world.”42 The Maccabees, though, were considered to be the role model par
excellence. Lehi publications were at pains to point out the implications of the
Hasmonean victory of “the few over the many.”  Despite their small numbers, it
was argued, the members of Lehi must perform “a Maccabean act” and conduct
“a war of national liberation, a war against Hellenists and traitors, a war of ter-
ror, and a war on the battlefield, against the alien ruler in the land.”43
Lehi propaganda tended to emphasize the determination rather than the
successes of Jewish fighters throughout the ages. The fact that they fought, not
that they won, was regarded as the crucial factor. However, this dichotomy is
somewhat misleading because, according to Lehi, all those who engage in the
struggle for Jewish independence are victorious in the end. Even if they lose a
battle, they transmit the love of freedom to their contemporaries and to future
generations. The struggle therefore continues unabated and will eventually be
crowned with success. Victory is assured.
The Jewish liberation struggle, like that of other nations, is in certain ways
unique. Each one depends on “the people, geography, and historical circum-
stances” concerned. Nevertheless, Lehi writings included many references to the
situation elsewhere in order “to substantiate and emphasize the essence of all
struggles for national independence.” 
Many of the examples drew attention to the longstanding evils of British
imperialism. They had, of course, assumed different guises at different times, but
the basic aim was always the same — the perpetuation of oppression.
“Missionaries with the cross, merchants with gold, and soldiers with arms” were
all enlisted to further the political and economic interests of the British Empire
around the world. By recounting the stories of nations that had freed themselves
from British tyranny and those still in the process of doing so, Lehi reiterated the
lesson learnt from Jewish history. Only armed resistance would lead to the expul-
sion of the foreign ruler and the establishment of an independent Jewish state in
the Promised Land.
Lehi propaganda portrayed British imperialism as more despotic than any
other kind of foreign rule and even as “the most perfect regime of oppression
ever.”  Nevertheless, frequent reference was made to the fate of other colonial
powers. Thus, the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires were
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often cited as proof of the fact that the mightiest rulers could be brought down
by determined action on the part of subjugated nations. Leaders of the Yishuv
should therefore follow the example of foreign heroes as well as those of the
Jewish people. Garibaldi, de Gaulle, and others were also appropriate models for
the struggle against the British presence in Palestine.
The fact that the stories were taken from “throughout the ages and from
around the world” led to the conclusion that they were rooted in the very nature
of the relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed. The “longstanding
law of the conqueror” asserts that oppressors never give up control voluntarily.
They do everything within their power to safeguard or, to be more precise, fur-
ther their political and economic interests. Consequently, nations hoping to gain
independence cannot rely on either the conscience or mercy of their oppressors.
They have to fight for their rights because “a motherland is only extricated from
the claws of the rapacious conqueror with blood, the blood of the enemy and the
blood of those fighting for their national home.”44
The struggle for independence always assumes the same form. It is started
by a small minority that arrives at a correct reading of the situation and draws the
appropriate conclusions as to how to change it. Their initial resistance leads to
further and even more cruel oppression. However, this is to no avail. In fact, the
attempt to suppress the revolt both deepens and widens the resistance to oppres-
sion. Besides “fanning the flames of hatred, strengthening the will to wage war,
and intensifying the aspirations for freedom” of those already involved in the
struggle for independence, it also transforms them into “an exemplary model” for
others. More and more of their compatriots accept the need to take up arms and
actually do so. There are, of course, further losses and defeats, but the struggle
for freedom continues to gain momentum and in accordance with “the iron law
of liberation” is eventually crowned with success: “Any subjugated nation that is
not contaminated by a spirit of degeneration and has a desire to live will fight for
its freedom. Any nation that fights for its freedom will in the end be victori-
ous.”45
This law is explained, in part at least, by the fact that national liberation
movements do not need to achieve an outright military victory in order to gain
independence. It is enough “to create a permanent state of war that demands con-
stant preparedness of large forces and causes a continuing feeling of unrest.”
This forces the oppressor to ask if “the gains are not outweighed by the losses”
and, in turn, to decide that it is in his best interest to concede defeat and grant
independence to the fledgling nation.
But even this kind of victory cannot be explained in terms of the physical
power of the liberation movement; its “spiritual superiority” over the oppressor
must also be taken into account. This advantage, Lehi leaders argued in the paper
Hama’as (The Deed), derives from the rightness of the cause:
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The oppressor has greater numbers and more physical power, but
these are not the only factors that determine the outcome of a war.
There is also the force of justice that guides the hand holding the
weapon. The spiritual superiority that accompanies the physical
force is the determining factor. It bestows courage on the freedom
fighters, enabling them to advance and attack under lethal gunfire.
The lack of spiritual strength and awareness of justice cause con-
sternation and panic in the heart of the persecutors and reveal the full
extent of their fear.46
Military strength is therefore deceptive. National liberation struggles indi-
cate that “not everything that appears weak is in fact weak, and not everything
that gives the impression of being strong is in fact strong.” Other factors, both
material and spiritual, have to be included in the balance of forces. When they
are taken into account, the final result is clear. In the end, right always overcomes
might.  
NESTED NARRATIVES: BIOGRAPHY
Although Lehi’s projective narratives were replete with references to Jews
throughout the ages who fought and died in the struggle for national independ-
ence, the movement took special pride in the feats of its own members.
Regulative biographies of Lehi heroes hailed the physical bravery and spiritual
courage of those who met their death in combat or on the scaffold. However, this
was by no means the whole story. Portrayals of the fallen did not only relate to
the period during which they fought in the underground. The biographies of Yair
and those who followed in his footsteps included detailed descriptions of how
they first internalized, then lived, and finally became part of the movement’s pro-
jective narrative.
When recounting the life histories of individual members, Lehi propagan-
da often drew attention to attributes that were regarded, with the benefit of hind-
sight of course, as early signs of their suitability for and interest in the movement.
Thus, the tendency of Eliahu Hakim, one of the assassins of Lord Moyne, to
stand up for himself in children’s games was cited as the first indication of his
courage. His subsequent lack of success in school was attributed not to a lack of
scholastic ability but to the distractions of “an agitated body and a heart that
yearns for action.” Clearly, therefore, it was only a matter of time until Hakim
went underground and took up arms against the British.47
Lehi heroes often drew attention to critical events in their lives that caused
them to join the movement. For Elahu Hakim the sight of Arab rioters was “the
first spark.”  In the case of his co-assassin, Eliahu Beit-Zuri, watching the British
police disperse a demonstration led to the realization that it was necessary “to use
force and to attack those who are responsible for all our troubles.”  Witnessing
violence of one kind or another prompted the nascent heroes to take a deeper
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look at things. Looking at their own personal experiences from an historical per-
spective they began to understand “the complete picture” and this, in turn, con-
vinced them to go underground.48
The need to ensure complete secrecy prevented Lehi from describing the
subsequent exploits of their members.  Instead, they concentrated attention on
how the fallen met their death at the hands of the British. The movement’s writ-
ten material and radio broadcasts were full of accounts about the physical brav-
ery of those killed and injured in the underground. Stories were told about how
they fought against seemingly insurmountable odds to the bitter end. Frequent
mention was also made of the Lehi members’ willingness to endanger themselves
to save their colleagues and their refusal to reveal the secrets of the underground
even when subjected to torture. Despite undergoing “superhuman pain,” all the
fighters went to their death with “the purity of the silent.”
Those who fell at the hands of the British were portrayed not only as
“noble men of action” but also as “spiritual heroes.”  They were depicted as a
combination of two seemingly antithetic components, such as book and sword,
and dream and action. However, these attributes were always regarded as being
complimentary rather than in conflict with each other. “The two elements, spirit
and matter blend together into a mixture of supreme power. The mission gives
direction to the weapons and the sword paves the way for the mission.”49
A profile of Yair published shortly after he was killed by the British hailed
him as the supreme embodiment of all these positive attributes and concluded
that he was “the acme of perfection.”  Henceforth, Yair was referred to in super-
human terms, as “a figure from another world.”50 In contrast, those who fol-
lowed in his footsteps were invariably portrayed as being very ordinary. One of
the fallen, for instance, was referred to as “a simple and innocent youngster with-
out any pretensions whatsoever,” and Lehi members in general were depicted as
being essentially similar to everybody else in the Yishuv. “They emerged from
amongst you. They are your flesh and blood.”  The message was clear: “If a typ-
ical youngster, an unknown soldier of the nation can die in this way, surely there
are thousands and even tens of thousands who are prepared to risk their lives.”51
Two kinds of heroes were therefore held up as a role model for the younger gen-
eration: the superhuman and the human, the perfect and those “striving for per-
fection.”
Both Yair and his followers, having lived and died in accordance with the
movement’s projective narrative, became an integral part of it. Time and again,
therefore, Lehi propaganda  emphasized the fact that they had not died in vain.
“The blood of earlier heroes flowed in their veins, and now their blood flows in
ours.” Their death was made meaningful by the life that it gave to the cause. 
The relationship between the fallen and those who followed in their foot-
steps was often portrayed as a reciprocal one. Those killed by the British pro-
vided a fresh set of role models for future generations. However, it was the
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knowledge that their sacrifice would be emulated by others that enabled them to
take up arms and risk being killed in the first place. Thus, when recruits swore
allegiance to the movement they promised that if sentenced to death they would
go to the gallows with “pride and peace of mind” in the belief that doing so “will
educate thousands of other fighters who will continue to struggle and ensure the
success of our mission.”52
In accordance with this oath, Eliahu Beit Zuri put on the red execution garb
and declared that it was “the most beautiful suit that I have ever worn.”  His fel-
low assassin, Elahu Hakim, even grinned on the way to the gallows. He was, he
reportedly said to the hangman, “smiling to the generations to come.”  In con-
trast, Winston Churchill, the British prime minister, “was enraged, angry and agi-
tated.”  According to a pamphlet that was published immediately after the hang-
ing: 
Despite temporary victories, the British Prime Minister felt that his
cause is lost. Immunity is not forever and the evil power will be
crushed. The two who were hanged felt, knew, and believed that the
goal which they devoted their lives to would be achieved. Their land
will be liberated and the Hebrew people will go from slavery to free-
dom.53
The scaffold was, therefore, an ideal stage for the morality play between Lehi and
the British government. The forces of good and evil “stood barefaced, one
against the other,” and their contrasting emotions reflected the final outcome of
the confrontation between them.54
DIALOGIC NARRATION
“Any given telling takes account of previous and anticipated tellings, and
responds to alternative and challenging stories.”55 As a result of this process of
dialogic narration, Lehi leaders were engaged in an ongoing colloquy with the
movement’s external and internal enemies. Their propaganda was in constant
dialogue with the narratives of the British government, the official leadership of
the Yishuv, and the sacred texts of orthodox Judaism. Although these dialogues
were neither autarkic nor monolithic entities, considering them separately helps
to delineate the particular form and content of each controversy and to under-
stand the major thrust of each one. 
Lehi countered the British narrative by claiming that its resort to terror was,
in fact, reactive. The Fighters for the Freedom of Israel had not started the cycle
of violence but simply responded to the actions of the mandatory authorities and
their presence in the Promised Land. Consequently, the members of Lehi, togeth-
er with the rest of the Yishuv, were the objects of violence and not its instigators.
The British were the victimizers and the Jews, as usual, were the victims.
This guilt transfer56 found linguistic expression in an ongoing war of
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labels.57 Lehi leaders tried to delegitimize the mandatory authorities in exactly
the same way as they were deviantized by them. Thus, the British government
and their representatives in Palestine were frequently referred to as criminals of
one kind or another — murderers, robbers, and pirates — terrorists in references
to terrorist laws and a terrorist government, and even as subhuman, through epi-
thets such as wild pigs, barbarians, and Nazis. They, not Lehi, were “the scum of
the earth.” 
Time and again, Lehi propaganda drew attention to the fact that, although
the leaders of Labor Zionism advocated taking concerted action against the
British, they rarely did so. Their failure to practice what they preached was attrib-
uted to the selfishness, shortsightedness, or sheer wickedness of those at the helm
of the Yishuv.58 In contrast, both the leaders of Lehi and its rank and file mem-
bers were depicted as being highly altruistic and blessed with foresight. They
were the only people in the pre-state Jewish settlement in Palestine who both
understood the situation and took the appropriate steps to change it.
This claim to uniqueness found linguistic expression in a wide variety of
dichotomies between the leaders and members of Lehi and their Labor Zionist
counterparts.  One set of images was religious in nature: sacred versus profane,
pure versus impure, and human versus immortal. Another focused on the dimen-
sion of time: past versus future, men of yesterday versus men of tomorrow, and
blind versus prophetic. Clearly, however, the aim of all these images and, for that
matter, all the others that were used, was the same. They were meant to empha-
size the difference between those who adopted a conciliatory stance toward the
British and those who fought steadfastly against them. The former told an unact-
ed projective narrative,59 the latter lived it to the full.
Lehi also portrayed the heroism of its members as being diametrically
opposed to the passivity and martyrdom of their religious forbears. Time and
again, religious Jews were lambasted for their belief in divine intervention and
their reliance on the coming of the Messiah. Confident of his arrival and willing
to wait until it happened, religious Jews did not feel the need to take the initia-
tive in changing the course of Jewish history. Some even believed that it was for-
bidden to do so. Lehi, in contrast, believed in both the need and efficacy of
human action in achieving national independence. After more than 2000 years of
exile the Jewish people must transform itself from being the object of history to
its subject. Although suffering may continue for a long time, it will be the active
suffering of war rather than the passive suffering of persecution. It will, there-
fore, serve a purpose instead of being to no avail. 
In common with other liberation movements, Lehi couched its attack on
the prior religious narrative in sacred terms. The struggle for national independ-
ence was regarded as “the holiest idea” of the Jewish people. Adherence to the
“commandments of the heroes of Israel throughout the generations” was, there-
fore, expected to be as strict as that of religious Jews to the divine laws. Alluding
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to the Shema, a prayer that observant Jews recite three times a day and on their
deathbed, those who had taken up arms against the British were called upon to
carry out each mission “with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your
might.”60 Freedom, like God, was holy; it also demanded unlimited love.
The written propaganda and radio broadcasts were both replete with cita-
tions of those commandments that were thought to be an endorsement of the
movement’s resort to violence. They included biblical precepts, such as an eye
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and so on,61 and later rabbinic injunctions, such as
if anyone comes to kill you, kill him first.62 The teachings of the prophets were
also frequently invoked. Significantly, the references were all of a particularistic
rather than universalistic nature. Lehi propagandists insisted that love of other
nations is reserved for the messianic era. Until then, the Gentiles would be the
object of divine revenge and “the Hebrew fighter entrusted with implementing
the prophecy.”
Lehi also appropriated religious rituals in its attempt to invest the move-
ment’s resort to violence with an aura of sanctity. They portrayed the traditional
mourning customs, for instance, as an empty and meaningless ritual that dese-
crated rather than hallowed the memory of the fallen and, even more important-
ly, as a catharsis that precludes the possibility of transforming valor into deeds.
Sorrow, Lehi leaders urged, must become “a source of rage and a goad to action.”
Members of the movement had to “forge the weapons of war from the blood of
the fallen and vent their anger in cruel and redemptive action.”63
Lehi adopted a similar stance toward the Jewish festivals. They were also
portrayed as an impediment to action. Significantly, this tendency was particu-
larly marked with regard to Passover and Hanukkah, the festivals that commem-
orate the liberation of the Jewish people from Egyptian bondage and Greek
dominion respectively. Thus, in contrast to the traditional notion that the lights of
the menorah are holy and are meant to “publicize the miracle” of the rededica-
tion of the Temple, Lehi used them to encourage people to take up arms against
the British and sanctify those who did so. An article in Hechazit (The Deed)
declared:
We will burn our bodies. Let our bodies be transformed into wicks.
Let our hatred become oil and let our faith be the flame . . ..  Let our
bodies be turned into burning candles. Let our blood be the holy
blood of Hanukkah. This blood and these candles are sacred and it is
a religious obligation to use them.64 
An announcement of the death of a Lehi fighter made a similar point. It
concluded with the opening words of the Kaddish, the traditional prayer in mem-
ory of the dead. However, the emphasis was completely different. The fallen hero
rather than the eternal God was being sanctified.
Arieh! Listen to the memorial prayer of your brothers and the oath of
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allegiance to our cause. As long as we live, we will fight for the free-
dom of Jerusalem and pray, like you, for the peace of Israel: with a
rifle and a mine. Blessed and praised be the memory of anonymous
soldiers, the fighters for the Kingdom of Israel. Magnified and sanc-
tified be his great name.65
The nature of the argument is clear. Lehi’s aim of liberating the homeland was
holy. So too, therefore, were all those who fought for it and any means by which
they did so.66
CONCLUSIONS
Lehi’s narratives and dialogues were, it seems, particularly elaborate
because of the special nature of the interaction between Jewish history and
Judaism on the one hand, and Jewish nationhood on the other.67 Nevertheless,
they provide an ideal starting point for the development of a model of this kind
of discourse. It needs to relate to three aspects of the liberation narratives: their
internal structure, the nature of the interaction between them, and the different
ways in which they are in dialogue with rival stories.
Liberation movements portray their current struggle as a morality play
between the forces of good and the forces of evil at the end of which they will
emerge victorious. Time and again, they insist that, despite the seemingly insur-
mountable odds and the fact that the conflict may be a long and bloody one, the
foreign ruler will eventually be driven out and independence gained. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, right is might, and it will, therefore, ultimately prevail. 
The propaganda of liberation movements is replete with parallels between
their current struggle against the foreign ruler and earlier ones of their own
nation, or other nations that had to fight for their independence. These stories of
the present and past are, in turn, nested in metahistorical narratives about the
longstanding suffering of the nation in question, or of the relationship between
oppressor and oppressed nations in general. They are portrayed as instances of
an underlying historical pattern or even an immutable law of nature.
The rhetoric of liberation movements also provides a classic example of
the way in which life histories are embedded in the story of the group within
which those concerned find their identity.68 The regulative biographies of past
and particularly contemporary heroes are constructed so as to show how they
first learnt, then lived, and finally became an integral part of the movement’s pro-
jective narrative. Those who fell in the struggle for independence are portrayed
not as outcasts from society but as paradigmatic figures of its dearest values. 
The three sets of nested narratives — the present within the past, the
national within the universal, and the individual within the collective — tend to
reinforce each other because  they all make the same basic point. Every story
insists that victory is assured. Clearly, however, the narratives are not only meant
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to predict the future; they are also supposed to help shape it by galvanizing peo-
ple into taking up arms against the enemy and ousting them from the motherland
in order to achieve national independence. 
All the liberation narratives are in constant dialogue with those of the occu-
pying power, other nationalists, and the religious authorities (see Table 1). Each
colloquy is characterized by a different dichotomy (content) and a particular kind
of discourse (form).
While in total disagreement with these rival stories, the national liberation
movement cannot be oblivious to them. The foreign, dominant, and prior narra-
tives do not only have sufficient dialogic force to compel attention; to a large
extent at least, they provide the inferential structure for the stories of the libera-
tion movement. In the war of words, it is not the freedom fighters but their rivals
that set the contours of the conflict.
Table 1. Dialogic Narration
Enemy Narrative Content Form 
Occupying power Foreign Victimizer/victim Inversion  
Other nationalists Dominant Altruist/egoist Contrast   
Religious authorities Prior Martyr/hero Appropriation
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